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AUSTRALIAN WOOL AND CHINESE INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1901-41  
PETER GIBSON AND SIMON VILLE  
University of Wollongong, Australia 
 
Chinese industrialization has been understood chiefly in terms of China’s engagement with 
more powerful countries, especially Japan and Britain. During the early twentieth century, 
nevertheless, the development of China’s woolen industry—part of a broader program of 
Chinese industrial development—depended largely on an import trade in raw wool from 
Australia. Through a study of this industry and trade, we show how a minor world power 
played a more significant part in Chinese industrialization than previously imagined. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In 1894, Chinese-Australian merchant, philanthropist and Qing government representative 
Quong Tart (梅光達 Mei Guangda 1850-1903) departed Sydney for China, determined, as he 
put it, “to open up a market there for Australian wool.” With assistance from wool growers in 
Australia, and through connections with officials and industrialists in China, he intended to 
“advise those in authority to take the wool” and to tell Chinese people that “by wearing 
woolen clothing they would live longer and be more comfortable.” Quong Tart was 
noncommittal about his prospects for success in China, and this particular wool-selling 
2 
 
mission had a limited impact, but he made a prescient statement on departing from Sydney. 
He was sure, he explained, “that the day was not far distant” when wool from Australia 
would be fuelling a robust Chinese woolen industry.1 
Chinese woolen manufacturing advanced dramatically over the next four decades, 
supplied by a new raw wool trade between Australia and China. One of several Chinese 
industries to develop during the early twentieth century, it depended largely on Australian 
imports. It had humble beginnings, though by the end of the 1930s it had expanded to some 
14 large woolen spinning mills and a multitude of smaller textile and clothing establishments, 
most of which were heavily reliant on wool from Australia.2 
 We explore the development of the Chinese woolen industry and the Australia-China 
wool trade between 1901 and 1941. Using unexamined and underexamined source material—
Chinese and Australian diplomatic correspondence, personal and firm records, Chinese- and 
English-language newspapers published in China and Australia, and economic publications—
and combining business and economic history approaches in analysing this source material, 
we highlight the importance of Australian wool to this Chinese industry. We show how a 
cooperative economic relationship with a minor world power, Australia, was a driver of 
Chinese industrialization, which challenges views of this endeavor as one defined by China’s 
dealings with the major powers. We begin our discussion with an overview of histories of 
Chinese industrialization and locate our work within this scholarship. We then explore the 
woolen industry and the wool trade chronologically through four periods corresponding to the 
different phases of their development. 
 
                                                        
1 Evening News (Sydney) (EN), 19 April 1894, 6. 
2 Vivian Bowden, “Sino-Australian Trade,” 21 April 1937, Australia-China Commercial Relations Part 1, 
National Archives of Australia (NAA) A609 555/35/1. 
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HISTORIES OF CHINESE INDUSTRIALIZATION  
Thomas Rawski’s classic work Economic Growth in Prewar China illustrated how Chinese 
industrialization was directed against the leading industrial nations. Adopting a linkages style 
argument and the epithet “domestic, private, civilian and competitive”, he argued that the 
growth of industrial manufacturing in China was characterized mainly by Chinese 
industrialists from within the private sector harnessing traditional primary industries, 
domestic transport and financial services, and local consumer goods markets.3 This, Rawski 
has shown, countered the predominance of goods imported from more developed countries, 
particularly cotton products from Japan.4 
 Since Rawski’s landmark book, several historians have conceptualized Chinese 
industrialization as typified by opposition to major world powers.5 Du Xuncheng and others 
have stressed the significance of nationalist—primarily anti-Japanese and anti-British—
consumer campaigns and protectionist government policies to the growth of Chinese 
manufacturing over the early twentieth century.6 Some historians have examined how these 
                                                        
3 Thomas Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 63-4. 
See further Marie-Claire Bergère, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989); Zhang Zhongli, “Guanyu Zhongguo minzu ziben zai ershi niandai de 
fazhan wenti” [On the development of Chinese national capital in the 1920s], Shehui kexue [Social science] 10 
(1983): 42-6; Wang Yuru, “Lun liangci shijie dazhan zhijian Zhongguo jingji de fazhan” [Essay on the 
development of China’s economy between the world wars], Zhonggu jingji shi yanjiu [Chinese economic 
history research] 2 (1987): 97-109. 
4 Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China, 95-7, 105. 
5 Another vein of scholarship has considered the differences in the industrial trajectories of China and the West. 
See, for instance, Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern 
World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Roy Bin Wong, 
Before and Beyond Divergence: The Politics of Economic Change in China and Europe (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011). 
6 Du Xuncheng, Minzu zibenzhuyi yu jiu Zhonguo zhengfu, 1840-1937 [National capitalism and the old Chinese 
government, 1840-1937] (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1991); Yu Baotang, 
Guominzhengfu yu Minguo jingji [The national government and the economy of the Republic of China] 
(Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 1998); Karl Gerth, China Made: Consumer Culture and the 
Creation of the Nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Harumi Goto Shibata, “Japanese and 
British Perceptions of Chinese Boycotts in Shanghai: With Special Reference to the Anti-Japanese Boycotts, 
1928-31,” in Kaoru Sugihara, ed., Japan, China, and the Growth of the International Economy, 1850-1949 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 127-44; Toru Kubo, “The Tariff Policy of the Nationalist 
Government, 1929-36: A Historical Assessment,” in Sugihara, ed., Japan, China, and the Growth of the 
International Economy, 1850-1949, 145-76. 
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campaigns and policies impacted on specific industries, including woolen manufacturing. 
Brett Sheehan has revealed how nationalism facilitated the establishment and operation of 
Song Feiqing’s (宋奜卿 1899-1955) Tianjin-based woolen yarn spinning firm in the 1930s, 
which challenged Japanese and British imports for control of the Chinese market.7 
Other scholars have emphasised the centrality of China’s collaboration with more 
powerful countries to its industrial advancement. With her business and economic history of 
Zhang Jian’s (張謇 1853-1926) Nantong-based cotton production enterprise, Elizabeth Köll 
has contended that the dissemination of ‘modern’ Western approaches to industry throughout 
China, combined with ‘traditional’ Chinese approaches, were critical to its industrialization.8 
Historians including Xiao Aili have also highlighted the importance of Japanese, British and 
American technology, along with their capital, raw materials and shipping, to China’s 
industrial ambitions.9 
                                                        
7 Brett Sheehan, Industrial Eden: A Chinese Capitalist Vision (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2015). Refer also to Zhao Jin, “20 shiji 30 niandai siying qiye de weiji yu biange—yi Shanghai Zhonghua 
maorong fangzhi gongsi weili” [Crisis and change for private enterprises in the 1930s—the case of Shanghai 
Zhanghua Plush Textile Company], Shanghai shifandaxue xuebao [Journal of Shanghai Normal University] 3 
(2017): 141-52. Another study of Chinese textiles that stresses, like Rawski’s, mobilization of domestic 
resources is Zhou Qicheng et al, eds., Zhongguo jindai fangzhi shi [The history of modern Chinese textiles] 
(Shanghai: Chinese Textile Publishing House, 1997). 
8 Elisabeth Köll, From Cotton Mill to Business Empire: The Emergence of Regional Enterprises in Modern 
China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003). On the uptake of “scientific” management in 
Chinese manufacturing, consult also Stephen Morgan, “Transfer of Taylorist ideas to China, 1910-1930s,” 
Journal of Management History 12, 4 (2006): 408-24. 
9 Xiao Aili, “Shanghai jindai fangzhi jishu de yinjin yu chuangxin—jiyu ‘Shenbao’ de zonghe yanjiu” 
[Shanghai modern textile technology introduction and innovation—a comprehensive study based on ‘Shenbao’ 
(PhD diss., Donghua University, 2012); Zheng Jianshun, “Jishu yinjin yu qiye fazhan—kangzhan qian 
Zhanghua maorong fangzhi gongsi de geanyanjiu” [Technology introduction and enterprise development—the 
case of Zhanghau Plush Textile Company before the Anti-Japanese War], Zhongguo shehui jingji shi yanjiu 
[Chinese social and economic history research] 2, 1 (2007): 99-103. See alsoTomoko Shiroyama, “China’s 
Relations with the International Monetary System in the 20th Century: Historical Analysis and Contemporary 
Implication,” in Shigeru Akita and Nicholas White, eds., The International Order of Asia in the 1930s and 
1950s (London: Routledge, 2010), 233-54; Wu Lin-chun, “Partnership across the Pacific: Sino–American 
Collaboration in Maritime Transportation during World War I,” Journal of Modern Chinese History 9, 2 (2015): 
199-222. Regarding Cold-War interactions, see Modern Asian Studies 51, 1 (2017). 
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Historical scholarship has seldom touched on the roles of minor powers in Chinese 
industrial development.10 William Kirby explored China’s relationship with a defeated 
Germany after World War One. Chinese powerbrokers, he argued, saw Germany’s post-war 
recovery as a model of modern economic expansion that was neither revolutionary, like the 
Soviet Union’s, nor imperialist, like the victorious powers’, and treated it as a counterbalance 
to these nations. Chinese raw materials, Kirby observed, were exported to Germany in return 
for consumer products and military equipment.11 Similarly, though his observations await 
further examination, Hajime Kose has noted how India became an important supplier of raw 
cotton to China in the 1930s and how Egypt became the main foreign purchaser of Chinese 
cotton goods in this era.12 Historians have briefly noted that wool from Australia was used in 
Chinese woolen mills and factories.13 
In this paper, we show how a minor power, Australia, played a significant part in 
Chinese industrialization through the supply of a necessary raw material, wool. With its late 
developing economy that was neither revolutionary nor imperialist, we highlight how 
Australia, as with Germany, provided a counterbalance to China’s uneven dealings with 
larger economic powers. Australia also provided a higher degree of complementarity than 
Germany, since there were few consumer goods manufactured in Australia to compete with 
                                                        
10 While he considered economic sanctions against Japan during the 1930s, not industrialization in China, 
Kosmas Tsokhas has lamented the neglect of the role of minor powers such as Australia in helping to shape 
Asia’s past. See Kosmas Tsokhas, “‘Trouble Must Follow’: Australia’s Ban on Iron Exports to Japan in 1938’, 
Modern Asian Studies 29, 4 (1995): 871-92. 
11 William Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984). 
Recent research on this subject includes Tan Kanjie, “Wan Qing min chu Zhongguoren dui Deguoren zhiji qi 
yingxiang—yi ‘zhishijie’ wei zhongxin de kaocha” [German influence on Chinese thought during the late Qing 
and early Republic—an ‘intellectual circle’ case study] (PhD diss., Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2017). 
12 Hajime Kose, “Foreign Trade, Internal Trade, and Industrialization: Patterns of Regional Commodity Flows, 
1914-31,” in Sugihara, ed., Japan, China, and the Growth of the International Economy, 1850-1949, 198-214. 
Regarding Chinese exports to Southeast Asia, see Kubo, “The Tariff Policy of the Nationalist Government, 
1929-36,” 146. 
13 Sherman Cochran and Andrew Hsieh, The Lius of Shanghai (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2013), 266, 290, 337; Sheehan, Industrial Eden, 71; Zhao, “20 shiji 30 niandai siying qiye de weiji yu biange”, 
144-5; Zhou et al, eds., Zhongguo jindai fangzhi shi, 278, 281, 322; Zhu Hanguo and Yang Qun, eds., Zhonghua 




Chinese manufactures. In thus demonstrating Australia’s place in Chinese industrialization, 
we contest the primary historical focus on China’s dealings with leading industrial nations. 
Through combining business and economic history, much like Köll has done in relation to 
Zhang Jian’s cotton textile firm, we also offset the emphasis on impersonal economic and 
political forces in the literature. 
 
A MODEST TRADE IN WOOL, 1901-14  
China’s earliest woolen textile facilities were established in the final years of the Qing 
dynasty. While few in number, these were mostly state-owned or state-sponsored and were 
constructed to produce cloth for military uniforms. The first such facility opened in Lanzhou, 
Gansu, during the early 1870s under the auspices of Viceroy Zuo Zongtang (左宗棠 1812-
1885), the notable army reformer.14 Another early establishment constructed primarily for 
military purposes was the Hubei Felt and Woolen Cloth Factory (湖北氈呢厰 Hubei zhan ni 
chang), built around the turn of the century near the central China military hub of Wuchang, 
Hubei.15 Chinese capitalists funded private concerns in late-Qing China, too. These were built 
to help meet a rising demand for European woolen fashions, introduced to Chinese 
consumers by Western traders and missionaries through treaty ports, and by Chinese migrants 
returning home from overseas, especially from the US and Australia.16 A private concern, 
                                                        
14 “Shanghai Woollen Textile Factories,” Chinese Economic Journal (CEJ) 11 (1932): 436. See also Lin Long, 
“Zhongguo di-yi ge jiqi mao fangzhi gongchang shi zenyang chuangban qilai de” [How China’s first machine 
woolen textile factory was established], Lanzhou Daxue xuebao [Lanzhou University journal] 2 (1981): 91-5; 
Jia Shucun, “Chuangban Zhongguo di-yi jia jindai jiqi mao fangzhi gongchang de Lai Zhang” [China’s first 
modern machine woolen textile factory, established by Lai Zhang], Lingnan wenshi [Lingnan literature and 
history] 4 (2003): 55-9. 
15 “Shanghai Woollen Textile Factories,” 437; Zhu and Yang, eds., Zhonghua Minguo shi, 22. 
16 Sheehan, Industrial Eden, 22, 66; Chinese Times (Melbourne), 13 April 1912, 4. On woolen fashions of this 
era, refer additionally to Liu Yunhua, “Hong bang caifeng yanjiu” [Red gang tailor research] (PhD diss., Suzhou 
University, 2008); Yuan Haixiao, “Minguo shishang yu fushi zhidu—yi nvzi fushi wei zhongxin de kaocha” 
[Republican China’s fashion and apparel system—a women’s clothing case study] (PhD diss., East China 
Normal University, 2011). 
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constructed in 1906 in Qinghe County, Hebei, was that of the Pu Li Company (溥利公司 Puli 
gongsi); another facility, built in Shanghai in 1907, was the Bright Sun Woolen Cloth Factory 
(日暉織呢厰 Rihui zhi ni chang).17 These establishments constituted some of the first steps 
towards overturning the predominance of imported, principally British, consumer goods, 
which included woolen goods from the mills of Yorkshire. These were the ‘golden days of 
British industry and trade’, as pointed out by historian Harumi Goto Shibata, against which 
resentment had been brewing in China, and to which domestic manufacturers responded.18 
The Bright Sun Woolen Cloth Factory in Shanghai touted the superiority of its own products 
over foreign ones.19 Foreign experts and technology, nevertheless, were still needed for these 
establishments.20 
 Chinese production of raw wool was extensive by the turn of the twentieth century; 
however, little of it was suitable for the new woolen industry. Some local varieties, such as 
Manchurian, Mongolian and Tibetan “spring wool” (春毛 chun mao), were appropriate for 
the manufacture of woolen textiles, as were several varieties from Gansu, Hebei, and 
Henan.21 This could explain the location of some of the first mills, that is, in, or in close 
proximity to, these wool growing regions. However, most domestic wool was coarse-grade, 
best suited for manufacturing rugs and carpets, not cloth, and was exported for this purpose, 
                                                        
17 “Shanghai Woollen Textile Factories,” 437; Shenbao [Declaration] (Shanghai), 1 January 1909, 1. 
18 Shibata, “Japanese and British Perceptions of Chinese Boycotts in Shanghai,” 128. There was similar 
resentment against other major powers. See, for instance, Daniel Meissner, “Imports and Industrialization: 
China’s ‘War’ Against American Flour Imports, 1895-1910,” Twentieth-Century China 28, 2 (2003): 1-40. 
19 Shenbao [Declaration] (Shanghai), 1 January 1909, 1. 
20 “Shanghai Woollen Textile Factories,” 436-7; Zheng, “Jishu yinjin yu qiye fazhan,” 99-100; Wang Changfan, 
“Shanghai maofang gonghui shimo” [Shanghai Wool Spinning Association beginning to end], Gongshang shi 
yuan [Industrial and commercial history] 2 (2012), accessed 4 May 2018, 
http://oldweb.acfic.org.cn/zt/11/gssy/6/new5.htm. 
21 Shenbao, 4 June 1912, 3; “Shanghai Woollen Textile Factories,” 437-8; Albert Rasmussen, “The Wool Trade 
of North China,” Pacific Affairs 9, 1 (1936): 60-8. 
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predominantly to the US.22 In 1907, China was the second largest source of American wool 
imports (39m lbs) after Australia (52m lbs).23 Local and foreign general trading and wool 
export merchants operated in Tianjin, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Hankou, using 
the treaty ports to purchase wool privately from Chinese inland traders and then shipping it 
directly to overseas carpet manufacturers.24 Although beneficial to several sectors of the 
Chinese economy, the preponderance of such wool regularly left pioneering domestic woolen 
manufacturers short of supplies. Thus, some people looked to Australia. In 1912, for instance, 
Tian Junfeng (田駿豐 dates unknown), a senator and the Financial Secretary of Gansu 
province, urged readers of Shanghai’s Shenbao (申報) newspaper that sourcing the “best” 
Australian wool was vital to overcome the limitations of Chinese wool and move China’s 
woolen industry forward.25 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Australia was the leading producer and 
exporter of fine-grade merino wool suitable for high-quality clothing, and accounted for 40 
per cent of global supply.26 Wool was Australia’s most valuable export, providing income for 
importing manufactured goods, including capital goods, and for financing infrastructure 
development.27 Wool was increasingly sold in Australia prior to export, which gradually 
marginalised the European auctions of internationally consigned wool, particularly in 
                                                        
22 Shenbao, 4 June 1912, 3; “The Cotton and Woollen Weaving Mills of Shanghai,” CEJ 4 (1929): 454-9; 
Rasmussen, “The Wool Trade of North China,” 60-8. 
23 Dalgety’s Annual Wool Review, 1909-10 (Sydney: Dalgety and Company), 16. 
24 World’s Wool, 1927 (London: Thomas Skinner), 181-2. See also Li Xiaoying, “Shuangchong yinsu zhiyue xia 
de yangmao maoyi (1894-1937 nian)” [Dual-factor wool trade (1894-1937), Xibeishida xuebao [Journal of 
Northwest Normal University] 48, 5 (2011): 43-9; Li Xiaoying, “Wenhua wangluo yu yangmao maoyi: jindai 
Gan Ning Qing Huizu shangren (1894-1937 nian)” [Culture, network and wool trade: modern Gan-, Ning-, and 
Qing-region Hui merchants (1894-1937)] (PhD diss., Xiamen University, 2007). 
25 Shenbao, 4 June 1912, 3. 
26 Stephen Brearley, “The International Wool Market, 1840-1913” (PhD diss., University of Leicester, 2004), 
48. 
27 Paul Cashin and Christopher McDermott, “‘Riding on the Sheep’s Back’: Examining Australia’s Dependence 
on Wool Exports,” Economic Record 78, 242 (2002): 251. 
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London.28 As the local selling industry grew and organised itself through industry 
associations and large brokers, it developed a coordinated system of auctions in major centres 
which was praised for its efficiency.29  Wool buyers were attracted to the Australian auctions 
from numerous countries as they were now able to import wool directly rather than through 
London. Firms arrived from Europe, particularly France and Germany, and opened offices in 
Sydney and Melbourne to supply their woolen industries.30 Japanese buyers also arrived in 
Australia to supply their relatively new, but rapidly growing, textiles industry. For them, 
purchasing in Australia meant a shorter, more direct trip home. Kanematsu (兼松) set up a 
branch in Sydney in the 1890s and was followed by other firms such as Mitsui (三井).31 
Chinese migrants made a sizeable contribution to wool growing in Australia. Chinese 
shepherds were engaged in small numbers by British pastoralists in New South Wales as 
early as the 1830s.32 Between the late 1840s and early 1850s, larger numbers of Chinese 
migrants, indentured labourers from Amoy, or Xiamen, travelled to the colony of New South 
Wales, where many worked on sheep farms.33 Following the gold rushes of the 1850s and 
1860s, thousands of migrants from the Pearl River Delta area of Guangdong, many of whom 
had originally arrived in Australia seeking gold, also entered the wool growing industry. 
They cleared land for grazing, sheared sheep and, as pictured in Figure 1, washed wool for 
                                                        
28 Simon Ville, “The Relocation of the International Market for Australian Wool,” Australian Economic History 
Review 45, 1 (2005): 73-95. 
29 A. F. Du Plessis, The Marketing of Wool (London: Pitman, 1931), 59; Gerda Blau, “Wool in the World 
Economy,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109, 3 (1946): 216-7. 
30 Ville, “The Relocation of the International Market for Australian Wool,” 81. 
31 William Purcell, “The Development of Japan’s Trading Company Network in Australia, 1890-1941,” 
Australian Economic History Review 21, 2 (1981): 116-7. 
32 Ian Jack, “Some Less Familiar Aspects of the Chinese in 19th-Century Australia,” in Henry Chan, Ann 
Curthoys and Nora Chiang, eds., The Overseas Chinese in Australasia: History, Settlement and Interactions 
(Canberra: ANU Press, 2001), 44-53. 
33 Maxine Darnell, “The Chinese Labour Trade to NSW, 1783-1853: An Exposition of Motives and Outcomes” 
(PhD diss., University of New England, 1997); Margaret Slocomb, Among Australia’s Pioneers: Chinese 
Indentured Pastoral Workers on the Northern Frontier, 1848 to c. 1880 (Bloomington: Balboa Press, 2014). 
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European employers and customers.34 Several, including James Chuey (黃柱 Huang Zhu 
1862-1938) of Junee in western New South Wales, gradually acquired their own sheep farms 
and wool brokerages, and rose to prominence.35 Anti-Chinese sentiment and the creation of 
“White Australia”, however, was an impediment to Chinese involvement in the Australian 
wool industry.36 “White Australia” also provoked outrage in China and, thus, discomfort in 
Britain because part of the Empire threatened to disrupt British commerce in China.37 
 
Figure 1. Chinese-Australian wool washers, c. 1900.38 
 
Drawing on knowledge accumulated within the Australian wool growing industry, 
Chinese-Australian migrants facilitated the first small wool shipments from Australia to 
Qing-era mills. Some served as the agents for customers in China at the Australian auctions. 
In 1908, to take one instance, representatives of Sydney’s conservative and largely pro-Qing 
Chinese-language newspaper the Tung Wah Times (東華報 Donghuabao) were reported 
bidding at the Sydney auctions on behalf of unnamed parties in China.39 Chinese-Australian 
migrants also acted in conjunction with non-Chinese wool growers and brokers in Australia. 
James Chuey, a grower and broker himself, was active in promoting the export of wool to 
                                                        
34 Barry McGowan, “Ringbarkers and Market Gardeners: A Comparison of the Rural Chinese of New South 
Wales and California,” Chinese America: History and Perspectives 19 (2006): 31-46.; Raymond Markey, 
“Populist Politics,” in Ann Curthoys and Andrew Markus, eds., Who Are Our Enemies? Racism and the 
Australian Working Class (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1978), 66-79. 
35 Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) (SMH), 13 October 1938, 7. 
36 Timothy Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1918), 1591-4. 
37 See, for instance, Marilyn Lake, “The Chinese Empire Encounters the British Empire and Its ‘Colonial 
Dependencies’: Melbourne, 1887,” in Sophie Couchman and Kate Bagnall, eds., Chinese Australians: Politics, 
Engagement and Resistance (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 98-116. 
38 “Washing wool at Enngonia Bore, near Bourke,” c. 1900, Kerry and Co. Australia, Museum of Applied Arts 
and Sciences, 85/1284-141. 
39 Farmer and Settler (Sydney), 5 June 1908, 3; Daily Telegraph (Sydney) (DT), 10 August 1908, 3. 
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China. Between 1903 and 1912, he collaborated with one of Australia’s foremost wool 
brokerage companies, John Bridge and Co., regarding a number of China-bound shipments.40 
For China, these consignments were an effort to supply its woolen industry and undermine 
British influence in the Chinese market for woolen products. For Australia, such shipments 
were designed to gain a degree of economic autonomy from Britain; they also helped counter 
anti-Chinese sentiment. Nevertheless, overall volumes of wool in this new trade were modest. 
In this era, most Australian wool was exported to Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the 
US. A portion of this wool eventually arrived in China as the foreign-made products against 
which the energies of Chinese manufacturers were directed.41 
Political upheaval and military conflict interrupted the early growth of Chinese 
woolen textiles production and, consequently, the wool trade between Australia and China. 
The toppling of the Qing government in 1911-12 and the subsequent fragmentation of China 
into states controlled by warlords in 1916 created an “inhospitable environment for business” 
in most parts of the country, especially for emerging industries, according to Sheehan.42 
Chinese woolen production was also impeded by the British wartime wool monopsony of 
Australian wool from 1916, which prevented direct wool exports from Australia to China.43 
By 1919, there were strong demands from Shanghai woolen manufacturers for an end to the 
monopsony and a resumption of Australian imports, although this did not occur until 1920, 
well after the conclusion of the war.44 World War One also hastened the entry of Japanese 
textiles—chiefly cotton, but also woolen—into the Chinese market.45 Redirection of 
                                                        
40 Chinese Australian Herald (Sydney) (CAH), 10 October 1903, 6; EN, 10 August 1908, 3; Tung Wah Times 
(TWT), 5 September 1908, 7; CAH, 3 April 1909, 2; SMH, 1 February 1912, 11; SMH, 12 September 1912, 6. 
41 Dalgety’s Review, 1908 (Sydney: Dalgety and Company), 110. 
42 Sheehan, Industrial Eden, 16. See also Andrew Atherton and Alex Newman, “The Emergence of the Private 
Entrepreneur in Reform Era China: Re-birth of an Earlier Tradition, or a More Recent Product of Development 
and Change?,” Business History 58, 3 (2016): 324-6. 
43 Ville, “The Relocation of the International Market for Australian Wool,” 78. 
44 Shenbao, 15 August 1919, 7; 21 September 1919, 22; 6 November 1919, 6. 
45 Zhang Zhongmin, “Di-yi Ci Shiji Dazhan qian Riben mianfang zhi qiye jinru Zhongguo de lujing yu tedian—
yi Shanghai fangzhi zhushihuishe weili” [Paths and characteristics of Japanese cotton textile entry into China 
12 
 
resources by European powers, especially shipping, for the war effort left a gap which 




CALLS FOR CHANGE, 1920-29  
The May Fourth Movement—originating in outrage over China’s marginalization at the 
Treaty of Versailles negotiations of 1919—stimulated an upsurge in Chinese nationalism and 
a heightened demand for China-made products, including woolen goods. Consumption of 
Chinese products was touted as a means of rescuing China from domination by foreign 
powers, which many regarded as no longer tolerable after the transfer of the German 
concession of Shandong to Japan instead of China in 1919.47 Cotton products, the market for 
which was awash with Japanese imports, received most attention.48 Woolen manufactures, 
too, were deemed prime targets for import substitution by Chinese nationalists.49 From 1920, 
home knitting with woolen yarn was marketed to Chinese women as a patriotic duty. Indeed, 
historian Antonia Finnane has examined several Chinese newspaper articles from this period 
where knitting features as a nationalistic, yet simultaneously a “modern” and “Western,” 
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activity for Chinese women.50 The increasing power of the Chinese Nationalist Party fostered 
such initiatives.51 
 The Chinese woolen industry grew markedly from 1920. New establishments were 
constructed in response to China’s increasingly nationalistic consumer culture, and to equip 
armies of the Warlord Era (1916-28) with uniforms and blankets.52 To an extent, new 
enterprises were an effort to boost export earnings, too, with woolen products shipped to 
Southeast Asia, to be purchased principally by Chinese migrants.53 Among the facilities to 
open were the Shengda Woolen Cloth Weaving Mills (勝達呢絨厰 Shengda nirong chang), 
the Asia Weaving Mill (亞細亞針樴厰 Yaxiya zhenzhichang), the Jingye Mill (精業工藝厰 
Jingye gongyi chang), along with the Lianhe Weaving Mill (聯和襪厰 Lianhe wa chang).54 
These establishments and most others opened over the 1920s were in Shanghai. As the 
busiest of China’s treaty ports, Shanghai avoided most of the disruption of the Warlord Era. 
With stable institutions, including secure property rights and the rule of law, it was the 
preferred location for industrialists to invest, and was the main hub of Chinese industrial 
development in this era.55 Shanghai offered the added benefit of being China’s traditional 
centre of cotton weaving with a ready supply of skilled workers. Modern cotton textile 
manufacturers derived the greatest benefit from this pool of skilled labour, yet some skills 
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associated with weaving cotton were transferable to the woolen industry.56 Certain cotton 
mills like the Xingxiang Cotton Weaving Mill (興祥棉織厰 Xingxiang mianzhichang) on 
Wuding Road, Shanghai, made both cotton and woolen products, and regularly combined 
cotton and wool fibres.57 Most new establishments, as with their Qing-era forerunners, 
required foreign machinery, which was sourced from Europe, the US and Japan.58 
Yet, China’s wool growers were unable to keep pace with the new developments. 
Unsuitable climates and limited breeding and pastoral practices militated against farmers 
producing sufficient quantities of fine-grade wool. Aware of these difficulties, Chinese 
officials and businesspeople attempted to address them. In 1921, for example, Governor Yan 
(閻錫山 Yan Xishan 1883-1960) brought 1,000 Australian merino sheep into Shanxi, seeking 
to building up the area’s stock.59 Such initiatives, however, were not expected to have a 
significant impact for several decades. Even if the hurdles associated with increasing 
domestic wool output could be overcome, China’s internal trade posed obstacles to supplying 
fine-grade wool. Albert Rasmussen (dates unknown), one industry commentator, drew 
attention in 1936 to the long-entrenched practice of adulterating wool with sand and dirt at 
multiple stages of trading to increase its weight.60 A lack of wool auctions, inspection of wool 
by customers and specialist brokers, all of which were standard practices in Australia, 
reduced incentives for the production of fine-grade wool. The 1921 revolution in Mongolia, 
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an important wool-growing region, further compromised supplies.61 An anthrax scare in 1922 
probably also discouraged the use of Chinese domestic wool supplies.62 
Under the circumstances, industrialists in China called for an expansion of the 
Australia-China wool trade. Shanghai’s Shenbao newspaper published several reports in the 
1920s that lauded the quality of Australian wool and highlighted the limitations of Chinese 
domestic wool, urging development of the trade.63 In 1924, F. A. Hooley of brokerage firm 
Leodell and Co. in Shanghai suggested that local mills were crying out for Australian wool, 
offering “a golden opportunity” to both countries.64 Further, in 1926, Luo Tingyu (羅聽餘 
dates unknown), manager of the Beijing Kaiyuan Wool Fabric Factory (北京開源呢絨工廠 
Beijing Kaiyuan nirong gongchang), penned an open letter to the Sydney Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce regarding closer trade ties. These were crucial, Luo explained, for securing 
supplies of high-quality Australian merino wool for manufacturers in China and for finding 
new markets for China-made woolen goods.65 
At the same time, Australian wool growers were searching for new markets in 
response to the difficult trading conditions of the 1920s. A wool glut following the lifting of 
Britain’s wartime monopsony depressed prices. Growers also feared for their industry’s 
future owing to the proliferation of other fibres, especially silk and its artificial form, rayon. 
Global output of rayon increased almost tenfold between 1914 and 1926, from 26m to 210m 
lbs.66 Such concerns had broader ramifications. Wool remained Australia’s chief source of 
export earnings and, more prosaically, held a special place in the national psyche. Leading 
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pastoralists and stud masters were celebrities and pastoral firms were among the largest 
businesses in the country.67 Australia was said to have ridden to modernity on the sheep’s 
back and the industry was deemed too important to fail. Even the spirit of “White Australia,” 
which risked dilution through new trading relationships in Asia, was open to re-examination 
in the search for new markets. 
There were thus calls from Australian wool producers for closer attention to the 
Australia-China wool trade. Growers’ associations proposed in 1921 that part of the wartime 
stockpile be given to China, free of charge, “as an advertisement” to stimulate the trade.68 
The most audible calls came from the Tasmanian Farmers and Stockowners Association, 
perhaps because of the influence of Tasmanian Senator Thomas Bakhap (1866-1923), an 
Australian of Chinese descent who championed more trade with China.69 That same year, 
Winchcombe Carson Ltd., one of Australia’s leading brokerage firms, declared that China’s 
“big population… offers immense opportunities for the development of the industry.”70 
Chinese-Australian entrepreneurs and organizations were adamant that the wool trade 
be expanded. In 1921, William Yinson Lee (李源信 Li Yuanxin 1884-1965) from Sydney’s 
On Yik Lee and Co. (安益利有限公司 Anyili youxian gongsi) called on Australian authorities 
to “immediately set about improving trade conditions between China and Australia” by 
subsidising direct shipping services to Shanghai. “Australian wool,” Lee suggested, could 
“capture the Chinese market.”71 Sydney’s Chinese Chamber of Commerce, along with the 
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Australasian branch of the Chinese Nationalist Party, supported such efforts by promoting 
interest in the wool trade among Chinese migrants; the organizations’ respective newspapers, 
the Tung Wah Times and the Chinese Republic News (報國民 Baoguomin), published various 
wool-related reports in this period.72 Encouraging bilateral trade was probably also intended 
to help soften anti-Chinese sentiment within Australia.73 
Alongside private sector exhortations in China and Australia, governments sought 
stronger trade ties. In 1921, following talks with Chinese authorities, Edward Little (李德立 
Li Deli 1864-1939) was appointed Australian trade commissioner in Shanghai by Prime 
Minister William Hughes (1862-1952). Little, who spoke Chinese fluently, was well-
qualified to effect growth in bilateral trade and set about his work with enthusiasm, 
approaching, among others, Chinese woolen industry representatives.74 Yet, Little was 
recalled almost immediately, in 1923, because of the shift by the new Australian Prime 
Minister Stanley Bruce (1883-1967) away from the trade policy of his predecessor.75 Little’s 
role was more than likely also compromised by his inability to negotiate trade deals that 
risked contravening those negotiated by the British. 
There was a brief spike in wool imports from Australia in the early 1920s. Even 
though the proposed gift of a part of Australia’s wartime stockpile did not proceed, Chinese 
manufacturers procured a considerable volume of wool over 1921-2. Nearly 0.7m lbs was 
imported, more than Australia sent to India, Austria, the Netherlands, Spain, or Sweden, and 
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the most purchased in a single year up to that point.76 Even so, direct wool shipments from 
Australia would not continue at this rate over the decade, diminishing to merely 2,000 lbs by 
1928-9.77 The new trading relationship had weakened, with one Australian contemporary 
blaming a reluctance amongst increasingly nationalistic Chinese merchants to engage with 
Australia because of its racist immigration policies.78 Indeed, Shanghai businesspeople were 
warned about “White Australia” and the difficulties associated with doing business there in 
the pages of Shenbao in the early 1920s.79 It is also possible, though not reflected in this 
newspaper, that Australian wool was seen as an extension of British imperialism in China, 
since Australian goods often bore the Union Jack, as noted by historian Sophie Loy-Wilson.80 
Nationalistic rhetoric was, however, inconsistent in relation to Australia during this period. 
As described by Benjamin Chapman, an Australian teacher in Wuchang, Hubei, in the 1920s, 
Australia was depicted as one of the “oppressed nations”: one that shared China’s struggle 
against imperialism.81 
Efforts to develop the Australia-China wool trade could have been more strenuous, 
but the main obstacle to protracted growth in the 1920s was the rapid increase in Japanese 
wool imports from Australia. These rose from 2 to 20 per cent of Australia’s total exports 
between 1920 and 1930.  Much of this was re-imported by China as part of what historian 
William Purcell has termed “the very profitable third country trade which existed between 
Australia and China.”82 Wool imported into China through Japan came in different forms: 
raw greasy wool as received from Australia; after processing (scoured and combed) as “tops” 
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ready for spinning; as yarn; as fabric; and as clothes. By 1929, close to half of the raw and 
semi-processed wool in Shanghai woolen facilities came indirectly from Australia, 
predominantly through Japan.83 Due to the substantially larger woolen industry in Japan 
compared with China, most wool arrived as woolen yarn, fabric, and finished clothing, which 
undermined Chinese domestic production of these items and stifled direct imports from 
Australia.84 Chinese-Australian newspapers described wool shipments to Japan negatively.85 
Rising Japanese influence in Chinese markets throughout the 1920s, including that for 
woolen goods, contributed to a virtual explosion of Chinese nationalism toward the end of the 
decade. All manner of Japanese products, particularly cotton textiles, competed with Chinese 
products to the detriment of Chinese industry, incensing many.86 Additionally, Japanese 
merchants, unlike their Western counterparts, had begun to transport their own wares around 
the country, thereby exacerbating discontent.87 Anti-Japanese sentiment peaked in May 1928, 
when Japanese and Chinese forces clashed at Jinan. Boycotts and the mass confiscation of 
Japanese products followed, as discussed by Shibata.88 Such activities were bolstered with the 
end of the Warlord Era and the reunification of China under the Nationalist Party in October 
1928.89 Chinese reunification also facilitated unified tariff protection for woolen and other 
manufacturers in 1929.90 
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TAKING ACTION, 1930-7  
The 1930s began with the novel idea of constructing an Australian woolen mill in China. 
Despite progress over the 1920s, Chinese capacity to process raw wool was constrained to a 
few large mills, and it was this limitation that an Australian facility was intended to address.91 
Australian wool growers were the foremost proponents of the mill since it offered a 
potentially very lucrative market for their exports. The Pastoralists’ Association of the 
Southern Riverina in New South Wales, in which grower James Chuey was involved, insisted 
in 1930 that the Australian government fund research into the idea.92 Australia’s Chinese-
language newspapers lauded this proposal, calling on Chinese migrants to consider investing 
in it.93 Chinese-Australian businesspeople, including Australia-born William Liu (劉光利 Li 
Guangli 1893-1983), subsequently commenced their own research into a new woolen mill. 
Shanghai’s extensive and well-known Wing On Textile Manufacturing Company (上海永安
紡織有限公司 Shanghai Yonan fangzhi youxian gongsi ) was particularly enthusiastic about 
Liu’s research, furnishing him with information about their cotton textile operations in 
1930.94 Liu also received an endorsement from within the Nationalist Ministry of Industries 
in 1931.95  Processing raw wool was more capital-intensive than the chiefly labour-intensive 
tasks of manufacturing cloth and clothes, hence the perceived need in China for foreign 
capital.96 Indeed, Australian investment in new wool processing facilities promised to assist 
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Chinese manufacturers in the patriotic project of import substitution by replacing semi-
processed wool from Japan and Britain, without depending on Japanese or British investment. 
 While the Australian-financed mill was considered, new mills were built in China. 
Local industrialists targeted the politically charged and tariff-protected Chinese consumer 
goods market.97 One facility set up in 1930 for this was the East Asia Wool Weaving and 
Spinning Limited Liability Corporation (東亞毛呢紡織股份有限公司 Dongya maoni fangzhi 
gufen youxian gongsi) in Tianjin, presided over by Song Feiqing.98 According to Sheehan, 
Song was an ardent nationalist, his adolescent years shaped by the May Fourth Movement, 
and viewed “business as the transformative engine China needed.”99 His “Butting Ram” (抵
羊 di yang) yarn brand, which he marketed to Chinese women through free knitting classes, 
was a homonym for “oppose foreigners” (抵洋 di yang).100 Song’s mill had the capacity to 
process raw greasy wool.101 Alongside rising demand for China-made consumer goods, there 
was renewed demand for woolen army uniforms owing to the rapidly deteriorating 
relationship with Japan and the urgency of military preparations. A mill catering to this need 
was Liu Hongsheng’s (劉鴻生 1888-1956) Zhanghua Woolen Cloth Weaving Company (章華
毛絨紡織 Zhanghua maorong fangzhi), which opened in 1930 in the Pudong district of 
Shanghai and could also process raw wool.102 Much of its output was khaki cloth for the 
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military, and by 1932 was the country’s most important supplier.103 Dependence on imported 
machinery within the woolen industry was diminishing over the early 1930s as ironworks in 
China were now able to manufacture spindles, looms, and the like.104 
 Chinese woolen textiles manufacturers were still frustrated by local supply issues, 
however, which worsened with the Japanese invasion of the wool-growing region of 
Manchuria in late 1931.105 Inadequate sources of fine-grade domestic wool were strained 
further from this point, due to the loss of the wool supply from this region and the intensified 
demand for Chinese domestic woolen products to replace Japanese ones.106 Japanese 
expansionism in Manchuria threatened Australian wool growers, too, creating sympathy in 
Australia for China’s plight. Japanese entrepreneurs were reported to have set about 
expanding cultivation of Manchurian wool for export to Japan, which, in turn, would reduce 
their spending at the Australian auctions.107 Australian-Japan relations began to deteriorate. 
Reacting to Japan’s designs on Manchuria, and to the economic uncertainty of the 
Great Depression, Chinese and Australian governments attempted to negotiate a free trade 
agreement during 1931-2. This would have reduced or eliminated tariffs on certain Chinese 
exports to Australia, primarily food items, along with Australian exports to China, including 
wool. Negotiations between the Chinese Consul-General in Sydney, Chen Weiping (陳維屛 
dates unknown), and Australian officials were proceeding well, but the treaty was aborted by 
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Australia because preferential treatment for its exports to China would have contravened 
several multilateral agreements negotiated for the British Empire.108 Indeed, the influence of 
Britain in the Australia-China trade, even though less marked than when Edward Little 
worked in Shanghai in the early 1920s, remained substantial. 
 Alive to the growing Chinese woolen textiles industry and its ongoing supply issues, 
Australian governments also explored means of exporting more wool to China directly in the 
opening years of the 1930s. During 1931, Prime Minister James Scullin (1876-1953) 
commissioned a report on Australian trade with China and Japan from noted Australian 
industrialist Herbert Gepp (1877-1954). Gepp saw “possibilities of the increased sales of 
Australian wool in China to be favourable.”109 Specifically, he predicted that the replacement 
of cotton coats with woolen and sheepskin ones in China would create more opportunities for 
Australia, provided that certain measures, including a new Australian trade commission in 
Shanghai, were instituted.110 Gepp warned, too, that Japan was preparing to substitute 
Australian wool with that imported from South Africa and South America, making the 
Chinese market an increasingly vital one.111 In 1932, Scullin’s successor, Joseph Lyons 
(1879-1939), set up the Commonwealth Wool Inquiry. It examined in detail how to expand 
exports to China, emphasising, like Gepp, increased production of woolen and sheepskin 
coats there.112 
 Australian wool industry groups launched several China-related initiatives in the early 
1930s. In 1930, the Graziers Federal Council of Australia pushed for an annual levy of 2s 6d 
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for every ₤100 of wool exported for “the purposes of wool research, wool publicity and the 
securing of new markets,” with China singled out due to its “considerable scope.”113 The 
Australian Woolgrowers Council, led in this period by Graham Waddell (1877-1960), also 
argued as part of a new publicity campaign in 1932 that some of the least affluent but most 
numerous Chinese consumers might be receptive to clothing made from coarser, cheaper 
grades of Australian wool, as opposed to the relatively small group of consumers who could 
afford to purchase premium merino wool clothes.114 The Australian Wool Board and the 
Department of Commerce provided fleeces and yarn samples for exhibition across China in 
this era as well.115 
As the decade unfolded, Chinese wool buyers began to participate directly in the 
Australian auctions. In 1934, it was widely reported in the Australian press that “a group of 
Chinese buyers is being trained [within Australia] by certain experienced Continental buyers 
in the classing and judging of wool, and in auction room tactics.”116 These first participants 
paved the way for others over subsequent years.117 Non-European wool buyers travelling to 
Australia faced race-based discrimination from immigration officials, which may have 
discouraged many, though these Chinese buyers appear to have been warmly welcomed. 
Along with their potential value to the economy given the deteriorating relationship with 
Japan, the international character of wool trading communities in Australia could well have 
worked to counteract racist sentiment. In Melbourne, for example, there were almost 50 firms 
that had originated overseas, or had overseas offices, nestled together in the wool-trading 
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precinct on the western edge of the CBD, and traders of different ethnicities mixed and 
mingled there.118 
 Plans for Australian woolen mills in China were drawn up jointly by Australians of 
Chinese and European descent as the 1930s advanced. The would-be industrialists made up 
several different groups, each with their own plans for a mill. In 1934, China Woolen Mills 
Development Company was established in Sydney. It consisted of the entrepreneur and 
Chinese Republic News editor David O’Young Narme (歐陽南 Ouyang Nan d. 1965), 
pastoralists and politicians William Fleming (1874-1961) and William Killen (1860-1939), 
and celebrity sheep breeder George Falkiner (1907-61), along with 40 other shareholders.119 
The firm coordinated with major brokers Australian Mercantile Loan and Finance Company, 
and with Toussaint Dewez (dates unknown), a prominent Belgian wool buyer in Australia.120 
Alex Kaw’s (d. 1976) Sydney-based China Indent Trading Company (雪梨中華國貨公司 
Xueli Zhonghua guohuo gongsi) started planning for their own mill in 1934 as well. Kaw, 
who had associates at the highest levels of Chinese government, including President Lin Sen 
(林森 1868-1943), and who knew the Australian Prime Minister Joseph Lyons personally, 
held talks on his plan with Graham Waddell and other Australian wool industry figures.121 
Kaw established the China-Australia Woolen Mills Syndicate in 1935 and organised a 
feasibility study for a new mill in Shanghai. The findings were encouraging, and approved by 
Roger Pirard (dates unknown), one of the leading authorities on wool in China.122 In 1934, 
William Liu also began to engage the Sincere and Wing On firms of Shanghai, two of the 
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“Four Great Companies,” in planning for a woolen mill.123 Liu saw the mill as a way of 
cutting what he called “Japanese muddlemen” out of the Australia-China wool trade, echoing 
the concerns of Chinese industrialists, and of challenging anti-Chinese feeling in “White 
Australia.”124 
 Cooperation between Chinese and Australian governments to increase bilateral trade 
was enhanced through the appointment of an Australian trade commissioner, Vivian Bowden 
(1884-1942), to Shanghai in 1935. Once the managing director of a large merchant house in 
Shanghai, Bowden was familiar with trading and business conditions in China and was 
supported by Arthur Nutt (dates unknown), who knew the Australian economy better than 
Bowden. Both men were optimistic about the opportunities for more Australian exports to 
China, especially wool, butter, and leather, as historian Boris Schedvin has indicated.125 The 
commissioners and their staff members, pictured in Figure 2, promoted Australian goods to 
representatives of government and commerce in China, communicated opportunities to the 
relevant parties back in Australia, and acted as agents of goodwill.126 The trade commission 
contributed to a deterioration in Australia-Japan relations, leading to what was described 
almost gleefully as a “trade war” between Australian and Japan in Shenbao.127 Indeed, 
Australia’s growing independence from Britain and closer military alignment with the US 
was also discussed enthusiastically by Chinese reporters in Shanghai.128 As such, Australia 
probably appeared friendly to China, as a nation also seeking to assert itself against more 
powerful nations, which is likely to have magnified the appeal of its wool. 
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Figure 2. Australian Trade Commission in Shanghai, 1937.129 
 
Hopes for the Australian mill were not realised, but woolen manufacturing in China 
expanded further in the mid-1930s. According to Bowden, China went from having four 
large, capital-intensive mills in 1932 to 14 by 1937.130 Bowden recorded, additionally, that 
the total number of spindles in mills had grown from 7,600 in 1933 to 42,352 by 1937, many 
of which were suited to spinning merino wool.131 Several facilities were constructed by 
Chinese industrialists, and were generously supported by Nationalist officials through extra 
tariffs, tax concessions, and patriotic campaigns, including National Products Year in 1933, 
Female National Products Year in 1934, and Student National Products Year in 1935.132 
China Woolen Textile Factory (中國毛絨紡織廠 Zhongguo maorong fangzhichang) in 
Shanghai was set up by Chen Zhilian (陳志廉 dates unknown) in 1934, predominantly to 
supply the market for woolen fashion items.133 However, several of the woolen facilities 
opened around this time were, much to the chagrin of patriots, Japanese and British 
establishments, constructed in China to avoid import tariffs. A Japanese mill, built in 
Shanghai in 1933, was that of Nissho Shanghai Textile Corporation (日商上海紡織株式會社 
Rishang Shanghai fangzhi zhushihuishe).134 The foremost facility constructed in this period, 
in 1934, also in Shanghai, was that of the British textiles company Patons and Baldwins. It 
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challenged Song Feiqing’s Tianjin mill in particular for control of the knitting yarn market, 
for which 9m lbs was being made domestically by 1936, up from only 1.7m lbs in 1934.135 
As woolen production in China expanded, so too did wool imports from Australia. 
The early 1930s saw minimal direct imports, but the second half of the decade witnessed 
remarkable growth.136 Indeed, valued at 41,452 Custom Gold Units (GU) in 1935, these 
imports were estimated at GU175,200 in 1936 and GU1,169,589 in 1937: there was nearly a 
28-fold increase in two years.137 By 1937, China was importing 1.5m lbs, surpassing the 
previous high of 0.7m lbs in 1921-2 and making it the second-most important purchaser of 
Australian wool tops globally.138 Scheduled amendments to tariffs, intended to encourage 
more unprocessed wool imports, also promised rapid gains the following year.139 The total 
taken by China was a small fraction of the 700m lbs of Australian exports overall, Japan 
remaining a much more important customer with over 840,000 wool spindles in mills, though 
the direct trade between Australia and China was clearly growing at the expense of third 
country trade.140 
Due largely to rising Chinese economic autonomy, Japan renewed military action in 
China in July 1937, which, in addition to devastating the country, disrupted cooperation with 
Australia in the development of the woolen industry. This was the principal reason why an 
Australian woolen mill was not constructed in China: Japanese invasion was deemed too 
likely by investors. In fact, in August 1936, Bowden advised that the promising Alex Kaw 
proposal not be supported owing to the probability of war in the near future.141 
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WAR WOOL, 1937-41  
China’s government representative in Australia was optimistic that the Sino-Japanese War 
would be brief and that trade with Australia, including that in wool, would resume quickly. 
The new Consul-General, Bao Junjian (保君建 dates unknown), authored a letter to J. F. 
Murphy (1893-1949) in the Australian Department of Commerce after the invasion of 1937, 
insisting: “Japan will never win and China will never lose. When the trouble is passed, that 
part of commerce which had been taken by the Japanese will have to change hands.”142 In 
1938, Bao also authored a book on this issue—A Century of Sino-Australian Relations—in 
which he stated: “with China’s economy secured and national independence safeguarded, 
China would be able to purchase the entire Australian wool clip, and then still be in need of 
more.”143 
 It became clear that the conflict would not be brief, yet many woolen facilities in 
China were running at full capacity shortly after the attack of 1937. As Sheehan has noted, 
treaty ports, in which many mills operated, commonly served as safe havens where Japanese 
military activity was moderated and Japanese authority was not always recognised.144 Hence, 
production often continued with minimal break. There was further demand on manufacturers, 
too, firstly, from the Japanese military, which commandeered some production capacity for 
making uniforms and blankets, and, secondly, from consumers in a destabilised economy 
where material goods had come to represent stability: described as the “economy of things” 
of wartime China by Sheehan.145 Certain operations even flourished under these conditions 
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and increased their output dramatically. Song Feiqing’s operation in Tianjin, for instance, 
raised productivity and profits from the latter half of 1937 until its best year in 1939.146 
Several manufacturers evacuated to western China, beyond the influence of the Japanese 
military.147 
A plan was also devised in 1939 to expand the woolen textiles industry in western 
China, which required wool and 2,000 hand looms from Australia. The aim was, ostensibly, 
to make 1,000,000 refugee blankets. At the centre of the plan was a Chinese Australian 
working within the Nationalist government, Mrs. Fabian Chow (dates unknown), as the 
personal secretary of Song Ailing (宋藹齡 1888-1973), the wife of Kong Xiangxi (孔祥熙 
1881-1967), Chinese Premier, and sister of Song Meiling (宋美齡 1897-2003), also known as 
Madame Chiang Kai-shek. Chow appealed to the Australian government, citing China’s and 
Australia’s shared status as developing economies and highlighting, like the Consul-General, 
the potential for post-war trade. This scheme was rejected by the Australian Wool Board, 
however, because of the expense of the required transportation of wool and equipment 
overland through Burma.148 
Wool growing regions in China were ravaged by the war, reducing supplies of 
Chinese domestic wool, and imports from Australia almost doubled between 1938 and 1941. 
At the close of 1941, a new peak of 3m lbs was being imported into China.149 This 
contributed to the Japanese war effort, undermining previous work done toward enhancing 
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Chinese economic self-determination. This was part of a broader yet highly questionable 
Australian strategy of using Japanese money to finance Australia’s own defence preparations 
for the expected war with Japan.150 The Australia-China wool trade ceased in December of 
1941 when that war did come, due chiefly to a new wartime wool monopsony for Britain. 
The trade would not resume until 1946, though the intervening years saw preparations within 
China for its resumption, illustrated perhaps most clearly in the form of Gu Zongyi’s (顧宗沂 




Australian wool played a significant part in the formative stages of Chinese industrialization 
in the early twentieth century. Shipments of high quality raw wool —facilitated by Chinese 
Australians—supplied China’s first woolen manufacturing operations from the early 1900s. 
Such operations were among the earliest efforts to overturn the predominance of foreign, 
principally British, woolen products on the Chinese market, but they were hampered by 
domestic political turmoil and a freeze on Australian wool exports during World War One. 
After World War One, China’s woolen industry expanded, fostered by concerns over rising 
Japanese influence in China, and there were calls in China and Australia for expansion of the 
Australia-China wool trade. This occurred in 1921-2, though Chinese woolen manufacturing 
was stifled by the rapid growth of Japan’s industry and its saturation of the Chinese market. 
In the early 1930s, Chinese woolen manufacturing advanced dramatically, as did its use of 
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Australian wool. Australian mills in China were planned—mainly by Chinese Australians—
to further boost the industry and the wool trade. Advancement was motivated primarily by 
increasingly hawkish Japanese foreign policy, which, while a powerful impetus initially, 
proved disruptive when it led to the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. Woolen production in 
China resumed under Japanese occupation, reaching new heights in the first years of the war. 
Yet, Australian wool exports came to a halt again when World War Two’s Pacific theatre 
opened in 1941, and they did not resume until 1946. 
 Australia complemented China’s industrial aspirations. It supplied China with a 
necessary raw material, fine-grade wool suitable for clothing in this instance. This enabled 
Chinese woolen manufacturers to compete with imports for control of the domestic market, 
and helped to challenge the country’s domination by more powerful nations. Australia’s 
resource-based economy and lack of manufacturing was highly useful to China as it could 
supply the required resource while not threatening to undermine industrialization efforts 
through selling its own manufactures on the Chinese market. Australia also benefited, 
supporting the Chinese woolen industry as part of its reorientation away from traditional 
European wool markets, which decreased in importance during the early twentieth century, 
and then later in response to its own economic disputes with Japan. Chinese Australians, too, 
used the wool trade as a means of building goodwill and countering racist sentiment within 
“White Australia.” 
Our study of the development of the Chinese woolen industry and the place of the 
Australian wool trade in it adds to historical scholarship. It builds on an evolving line of 
literature that elevates the place of nationalism and foreign relations in the program of 
Chinese industrialization. Using unexamined and underexamined source material and a 
combined business and economic history approach, it offsets the emphasis on competitive, 
often hostile, interactions with major global powers, especially Japan, demonstrating how a 
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complementary minor power, Australia, was able to balance the influence of major powers 
and facilitate the advancement of Chinese industrial manufacturing. This study also lays 
groundwork for further considerations of China’s international economic relationships 
beyond those with the leading world economies of the twentieth century. 
As well as its contribution to the literature, our paper is relevant to the longer sweep 
of China-Australia economic engagement, and indeed China’s interaction with some of the 
world’s smallest nations. China was able to develop its woolen industry to the extent that it is 
now the foremost in the world and has become the main consumer of Australian raw wool. 
Australia was, relatedly, able to diversify its wool markets away from Europe, then Japan, 
and remain the largest international grower and exporter of fine-grade wool. China-Australia 
trade now also involves vast amounts of other agricultural products and mineral resources, 
critical to the economies of both countries.152 This situation has been characterized as new, 
unusual, or even unnatural and sinister.153 China’s economic relations with other smaller 
nations has been seen similarly.154 Our work problematizes such conceptualizations, 
suggesting that they are inconsistent with historical precedent. 
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